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SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 
BY: EMILY A. LARGENT, JD, PHD, RN* ANDREW PETERSON, PHD**+ 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Jane, a retired attorney, has been diagnosed with mild cognitive 
impairment caused by Alzheimer’s disease. Jane’s physicians warn 
that this is a likely precursor to dementia and expect Jane will reach 
a severe level of impairment, requiring constant supervision, in the 
next two to five years.  At present, Jane has occasional difficulty 
understanding instructions and sometimes forgets appointments. She 
describes feeling increasingly overwhelmed by making decisions. 
Jane concedes that she needs help.  Jane has expressed a desire to 
maintain her independence, while Jane’s spouse wants to protect her 
in light of her obvious vulnerability. How should Jane and her spouse 
strike this balance?  And, how might this balance evolve as Jane’s 
cognitive and functional decline due to Alzheimer’s disease progress?   
 
The principle of respect for persons requires giving weight to the choices 
of people with the capacity for self-determination; however, respect for persons 
also requires protecting the welfare of those with diminished capacity.1 
Balancing these two obligations is fundamentally an ethical challenge—but one 
for which Jane, her spouse, and others like them often seek a legal solution.  The 
law has traditionally responded to cognitive disability and cognitive decline by 
authorizing surrogate decision-makers, legal proxies, or guardians to make 
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 1. Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 N. 
ENGL. J. OF MED., 1834, 1834 (2007); Assessment of Older Adults with Diminished Capacity: A 
Handbook for Lawyers, ABA COMMN. ON L. & AGING & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSN., 1, 3-5 (2005), 
https://www.apa.org/pi/aging/resources/guides/diminished-capacity.pdf.  
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decisions on behalf of the impaired person.2  Yet, the use of these surrogate 
decision-making regimes for persons with marginal capacity has increasingly 
been criticized for stripping people—in whole or in part—of their right to self-
determination.  Therefore, there have been calls domestically and internationally 
to supplant these regimes with alternative decision-making models that empower 
persons with disabilities.3   
Supported decision making offers just such an alternative paradigm and is 
rapidly gaining favor.4  Whereas surrogate decision-making regimes presume 
that decisions need to be made for persons with disabilities, supported decision-
making regimes presume that decisions can be made by persons with disabilities 
if they are provided adequate assistance.5  Open questions, remain, however, 
about how to understand the appropriate relationship between surrogate 
decision-making and supported decision-making. Are surrogate and supported 
decision-making regimes mutually exclusive, as some have suggested?  Or is it 
possible to transition between the two decision-making models under appropriate 
circumstances? Here, we will argue that surrogate and supported decision-
making regimes are best understood as serving different but complementary 
purposes.  Parties should have access to both decision-making regimes and may 
permissibly switch between them based on the demands of the decision-making 
context.  
Let’s return to Jane.  In the present, while she has mild cognitive 
impairment (MCI), supported decision-making seems ideal: it satisfies both 
Jane’s desire to exercise her capacity for self-determination and her partner’s 
(and the state’s) desire to protect her welfare.  However, as Jane’s Alzheimer’s 
disease progresses and her capacity for self-determination erodes, a surrogate 
decision-making regime, such as guardianship or conservatorship, will likely 
become essential.  A similar transition (though in reverse) might occur for those 
recovering from neurological insult, such as a traumatic brain injury or stroke.  
Such individuals may require surrogate decision-making in the acute phase of 
injury. Yet, as they recover, surrogate decision-making might naturally give way 
to supported decision-making as cognitive function returns.  
If we are correct that supported and surrogate decision-making are 
complementary regimes, then it is necessary to determine how best to chart the 
course between them. To date, much of the legal and ethical literature on 
supported decision-making has focused on its utility for individuals with “static 
 
 2. Shana Wynn, Decisions by Surrogates: An Overview of Surrogate Consent Laws in the United 
States, 36 BIFOCAL 10, 10 (2014). 
 3. Nandini Devi et al., Moving Towards Substituted or Supported Decision-making? Article 12 of 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 5 ALTER 249, 256 (2011). 
 4. Nina A. Kohn, et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship, 117 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (2012). 
 5. Id. 
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impairments”—in which cognitive and functional deficits do not change 
significantly over time—such as young adults with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities who are transitioning from being in the care of their 
families to independence.6  As a result, the question of transitioning between 
decision-making models has been less urgent.  But “[s]upported . . . decision-
making arrangements become difficult where an adult’s decision-making ability 
. . . fluctuates.”7  How might the transition from supported to surrogate decision-
making (or vice versa) operate for individuals with “dynamic impairments”?  
Dynamic impairments are characterized by clinically and practically significant 
fluctuations in cognition and function, often due to progressive 
neurodegenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer’s disease or Parkinson’s disease, 
or recovery from neurological insult.8  Millions of adults are affected by dynamic 
impairments in the United States and internationally.9  Therefore, as supported 
decision-making draws growing political support across the United States, it is 
important and timely to consider how we might best facilitate the transition 
between surrogate and supported decision-making.   
In this article, we examine the concept of supported decision-making in the 
United States and then look to the international context to better understand the 
interrelationship between surrogate and supported decision-making to improve 
U.S. laws.  In Section II, we outline the general ethical framework of supported 
decision-making.10 We argue that surrogate decision-making regimes should be 
a last resort for persons with marginal capacity; nevertheless, there remain cases 
in which surrogate decision-making is necessary due to the extent of a person’s 
cognitive and functional decline.  Supported decision-making therefore cannot 
entirely supplant surrogate decision-making.  In Section III, we review the 
relevant U.S. law, highlighting Texas’ supported decision-making law and 
Olmstead v. L.C.11 Then, in Section IV, we turn to the international context.12  
First, we review the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
which has been central to the international movement toward supported decision-
 
 6. See, e.g., Leslie P. Francis, Understanding Autonomy in Light of Intellectual Disability in  
DISABILITY AND DISADVANTAGE, 200-15, (Kimberley Brownlee and Adam Cureton eds., 2009) 
(explaining autonomy and diminished capacity in the context intellectual disabilities) ; see also Kristen 
Booth Glenn, Supported Decision-making and the Human Right of Legal Capacity, 3 INCLUSION  2, 2-
16 (providing an account of supported decision-making as honoring the fundamental human right of 
legal capacity). 
 7. Shih-Ning Then, Evolution and Innovation in Guardianship Laws: Assisted Decision Making, 
35 SYDNEY L. REV. 133, 161 (2013).   
 8. Hui-Ming Gao & Jau-Shyong Hong, Why Neurodegenerative Diseases are Progressive: 
Inflammation Drives Disease Progression, 29 TRENDS IN IMMUNOLOGY 357, 357 (2008). 
 9. Stephen W. Hawking, Foreword to WORLD REPORT ON DISABILITY at ix, (2011), 
https://www.who.int/disabilities/world_report/2011/report.pdf.   
 10. See infra Section II.  
 11. See infra Section III; Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 12. See infra Section IV. 
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making regimes.13 Second, we review the supported decision-making laws of 
three countries: Canada’s British Columbia Representation Agreement Act, 
Ireland’s Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act, and Australia’s Victoria 
Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Act 2016.14 These countries have 
more experience with supported decision-making, and an analysis of 
international models provides useful guidance for the U.S. context.  In Section 
V, we make recommendations for steps forward in the United States.15  We 
conclude our thoughts in Section VI.16  
II. SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING  
Supported decision-making is a model of decision-making in which an 
adult with diminished capacity (the “beneficiary”) enters freely into an 
agreement with a closely trusted person or persons (the “supporter(s)”) who will 
assist the beneficiary in exercising self-determination.17  While there is no single 
model of supported decision-making, implementation typically includes: (1) 
identifying the domains of life in which the beneficiary needs and desires help—
for example, financial or medical decision-making—based on the nature and 
intensity of the beneficiary’s impairments; (2) identifying the kinds of support 
that are needed and desired—for example, communication, interpretive, or 
representational support; and (3) establishing a formal supported decision-
making agreement between the beneficiary and the supporter(s).18 All supported 
decision-making models share a core feature: “the decision maker retains the 
right to make decisions and have them recognized by law.”19   
Justification for supported decision-making comes from the social model 
of disability, which holds that disability is not inherent to a person, but emerges 
from an interplay between a person’s impairments and the environment.20  Where 
a mismatch between a person’s capabilities and the environment exists, 
accommodations can address socially constructed barriers, thus enabling people 
with disabilities to partake in the same rights and freedoms as their nondisabled 
peers.  It is generally acknowledged that there are limits to the social model of 
disability and that even if all social barriers are removed, some impairments will 
 
 13. See infra Section IV.A. 
 14. See infra Sections IV.B-IV.D. 
 15. See infra Section V. 
 16. See infra Section VI.  
 17. Supported Decision Making and Health Care, NATIONAL DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK (Apr. 
25, 2019) https://www.ndrn.org/resource/supported-decision-making-and-health-care/. 
 18. Id.; see generally Kohn, supra note 4, at 1111-12, 1121. 
 19. Eliana J. Theodorou, Supported Decision-Making in the Lone-Star State, 93 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
973, 975 (2018). 
 20. See Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, IN THE DISABILITIES STUDIES READER 1, 
195-97 (Lennard J. Davis 5th ed., 2017) (contrasting the social and the medical models of disability). 
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remain disadvantageous.21  Nevertheless, the social model provides a framework 
for understanding social obligations to create inclusive environments for persons 
with disabilities.22  For example, individuals with impaired mobility should not 
be excluded from public spaces; we should build ramps and install wheelchair 
lifts to make public spaces accessible.23  The same reasoning leads to the 
conclusion that individuals with impaired cognition should not be unjustifiably 
excluded when decisions about their lives are being made.24  Compared to 
surrogate decision-making regimes that bar the door to decision-making, 
supported decision-making is analogous to ramps or lifts—a cognitive 
prosthesis—for a person with marginal capacity.25   
Yet, in thinking of the disability right’s movement credo “Nothing About 
Us Without Us,” it’s quickly apparent that supported decision-making cannot be 
imposed on people without consent.26  Rather, a beneficiary must voluntarily 
agree to participate in a supported decision-making relationship.  One puzzle 
raised by supported decision-making agreements is the assumption that the 
beneficiary is capable to enter into the agreement.  Yet, the need for supported 
decision-making implies that the beneficiary’s capacity is—to some degree—
diminished.  Given this diminished capacity, why would the beneficiary be 
presumed to have capacity to enter into a supported decision-making agreement?  
Stated simply, the ethics and law of decision-making capacity emphasize the 
nature of the decision at hand when determining whether a person has or lacks 
the capacity to make that decision.27  One implication of this assumption is that 
the type and level of ability needed to make one kind of decision—say, 
appointing a supporter or supporters—may be markedly different from the 
abilities needed to make more complicated and high-stakes decisions.28  
 
 21. Id. at 201-02. 
 22. Andrew Peterson, Jason Karlawish, & Emily A. Largent, Supported Decision Making for 
People at the Margins of Autonomy, AM. J. OF BIOETHICS, (forthcoming).  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See The Right to Make Choices: International Laws and Decision-Making by People with 
Disabilities, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK, 1, 9 
http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/asan-toolkit-right-to-make-choices.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2020) [hereinafter The Right to Make Choices] (stating “[I]magine that you want to find a place 
to live. . . . [i]f you are using supported decision-making instead of guardianship, you could simply call 
up your sister and have her help you through the process. If you have a guardian, you could not get an 
apartment without your guardian’s consent and assistance, even if you would rather have someone else 
help you instead of your guardian.  Even if your guardian could only make decisions about how you 
send your money, you wouldn’t be able to pay the rent for your apartment without their help.”).  
 26. JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND 
EMPOWERMENT, 17 (1st ed. 2000). 
 27. Appelbaum, supra note 1, at 1834-840. 
 28. Scott Y. H. Kim & Paul S. Appelbaum, The Capacity to Appoint a Proxy and the Possibility of 
Concurrent Proxy Directives, 24 BEHAV. SCI. L. 469, 469-70 (2006). 
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A helpful analogy can be drawn between entering into a supported decision-
making agreement and appointing a surrogate decision-maker at the end of life.  
In the end-of-life context, the law recognizes that someone incapable of giving 
consent to medical treatment may, nevertheless, retain the capacity sufficient to 
delegate decision-making authority to a surrogate.29  It has, moreover, been 
argued that the threshold of capacity to appoint a surrogate should be low relative 
to the threshold for more complicated medical decisions.30  This is consistent 
with an overall trend toward preserving autonomy even in persons with 
diminished capacity.31  Further, appointing a surrogate is, fundamentally, about 
trusting someone to make care decisions on your behalf; for most of us, trust is 
a familiar concept, and assessing your degree of trust in a potential surrogate—
typically a person with whom you are already in a close relationship—is an easier 
task than giving informed consent, which may require some mastery of medical 
or technical details.32   
Surely, however, even if the threshold of capacity required to select a 
supporter and enter into a supported decision-making agreement is set quite low, 
there will be some people for whom the bar is nevertheless too high to surmount.  
Imagine Sam, a legal adult who suffers a catastrophic brain injury and is left in 
a vegetative state, a neurological condition characterized by wakefulness without 
awareness.  Sam had the capacity to make decisions prior to injury, yet after his 
injury he is completely dependent on others to make decisions.33  Supported 
decision-making simply would not work after his injury.   
In other cases, supported decision-making may initially work but become 
untenable as a beneficiary’s cognitive and functional status declines.  Think back 
to Jane.  Assume that Jane and her spouse entered into a supported decision-
making agreement after Jane was diagnosed with MCI.  Supported decision-
making might work well for many years because Jane and her spouse 
continuously adjust the nature and intensity of support provided to compensate 
for Jane’s progressive cognitive and functional decline.  Yet, as Jane enters the 
late stage of dementia, she will no longer understand what is said to her and will 
have significant impairments in her ability to communicate.  At this point in the 
trajectory of her illness, it would be implausible—even with fulsome support—
that Jane would be capable of making her own decisions.  As these examples 
suggest, surrogate decision-making regimes are still needed even if robust 
supported decision-making regimes are available.  
 
 29. Id. at 469-71.  
 30. Id. at 473. 
 31. Theodorou, supra note 19, at 983-84.  
 32. Kim & Appelbaum, supra note 28, at 473-74.  
 33. We note that a host of options are available here.  Sam might have anticipated loss of capacity 
and assigned a durable power of attorney to a trusted person in his life.  Or, state law might have a 
hierarchy of health care agents.  In some instances, however, Sam might need a guardian appointed.   
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The fact that that individuals like Sam and Jane (in the later stages of 
dementia) require a surrogate decision-making regime does not imply that it is 
no longer necessary to respect their autonomy.34  A surrogate decision-maker 
might rely on substituted judgement to make decisions for Sam, Jane, and others 
like them.  Substituted judgment is premised on the ideal that surrogates use 
evidence of incapacitated individuals’ values, preferences, and interests to reach 
the decisions incapacitated individuals would have otherwise made for 
themselves had they retained capacity and been confronted with the same 
circumstances.35  Although incapacitated persons cannot make decisions for 
themselves, others can respect their autonomy by approximating the decisions 
they would have made.36  If the surrogate lacks sufficient information about the 
incapacitated individual’s values, preferences, and interests to make substituted 
judgment practical, the surrogate may be guided by the best interests standard, 
or what would be good for the incapacitated individual.  The underlying rationale 
for the best interests standard is beneficence, the moral obligation to act for the 
other’s benefit by helping them further their interests or preventing harms.37  
Because, as we have explained, it is widely accepted that autonomy has primacy 
over beneficence, surrogates should employ substituted judgment whenever 
possible.38   
Supported decision-making is preferable to surrogate decision-making in 
many—perhaps in most—circumstances because it allows the person with 
diminished capacity to exercise her autonomy.39  But, supported decision-
making is a complement, not a replacement, for surrogate decision-making 
regimes.  Once we acknowledge that surrogate and supported decision-making 
regimes must co-exist to meet the full range of needs of persons with cognitive 
and functional disabilities, we must also determine how to transition between 
these regimes.  Cognitive impairments place individuals on a spectrum of 
capacity: at one extreme, individuals have full capacity, while at the other, 
individuals are completely incapacitated.40 Many individuals will have static 
cognitive impairments, meaning that decision-making can be consistently 
conducted within one decision-making regime, but other individuals will have 
dynamic impairments.41 Persons with dynamic impairments fluctuate over time 
 
 34. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Fundamentals of Surrogate Decision Making, 141 CHEST 1074, 
1075 (2012). 
 35. Donna T. Chen et al., Substituted Judgment, 24 J. GEN  INTERNAL MED. 145, 145 (2009). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Agnieska Jaworska, , Advance Directives and Substitute Decision-Making, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed. Sum. 2007),  
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/advance-directives/. 
 38. Id.  
 39. See Peterson, Karlawish, & Largent, supra note 22.  
 40. See Peterson, Karlawish, & Largent, supra note 22; see also Kohn, et al., supra note 4.  
 41. Peterson, Karlawish, & Largent, supra note 22; see also Kohn, et al., supra note 4.   
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between the two poles.42  Thus, mechanisms for transitioning between supported 
and surrogate decision-making regimes are required to manage their decision-
making needs.43  
In what follows, we engage the question of transitioning between supported 
and surrogate decision-making for people with dynamic impairments. Supported 
decision-making is gaining traction across the United States, yet critical 
questions about how to bridge supported and surrogate decision-making are not 
adequately addressed in U.S. law. Under what conditions should this transition 
occur? Who decides when to execute this transition? And what legal mechanisms 
could facilitate this transition while also respecting autonomy and protecting 
welfare? In what follows, we first outline supported decision-making in the U.S. 
context. We then turn to supported decision-making laws in Canada, Ireland, and 
Australia for guidance.44  
III. SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING IN U.S. LAW  
All 50 states have laws about guardianship.45  Over the last decade, 
however, supported decision-making as an alternative to guardianship for 
persons with cognitive and intellectual disabilities has gained traction in U.S. 
law.46  Many disability rights and disability self-advocacy groups have argued 
that, whenever possible, supported decision-making should be pursued instead 
of guardianship.47  This reflects a forceful disability rights movement.  Disability 
advocacy led to—and gained significant momentum from—the ratification of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the 1990 civil rights law that prohibits 
discrimination against people with disabilities in public spaces.48 
In 1999, the landmark case Olmstead v. L.C.49 confronted the U.S. Supreme 
Court with “the question whether the [ADA] proscription of discrimination may 
require placement of persons with mental disabilities in community settings 
rather than in institutions.”50  The Supreme Court answered with a “qualified 
yes,” holding that under the ADA, states are obliged to place institutionalized 
persons with disabilities in community-based programs, provided that the person 
with disabilities desires this, that the healthcare team deems this appropriate, and 
 
 42. Peterson, Karlawish, & Largent, supra note 22; see also Kohn, et al., supra note 4. 
 43. Peterson, Karlawish, & Largent, supra note 22; see also Kohn, et al., supra note 4. 
 44. See infra Section IV.A-IV.C. 
 45. Morgan K. Whitlatch, Guardianship Laws by State, THE JENNY HATCH JUSTICE PROJECT,  
http://jennyhatchjusticeproject.org/50_state_review (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).  
 46. See Kohn, et al., supra note 4. 
 47. The Right to Make Choices, supra note 25, at 17-18. 
 48. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213).   
 49. 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999). 
 50. Id. at 587. 
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that adequate resources are available.51  Theorists, legal scholars, and disability 
rights advocates subsequently extended the conceptual foundations of Olmstead, 
arguing that the Court’s holding implies a requirement to rectify unjust isolation 
and social exclusion in all forms.52 This movement is sometimes referred to as 
“Olmstead Advocacy.”53  
One of the first cases to connect “Olmstead Advocacy” with supported 
decision-making involved a 29-year-old woman with Down Syndrome, Margaret 
“Jenny” Hatch, who lived independently in Hampton, Virginia until she was hit 
by a car while riding her bicycle.54  Shortly thereafter, Jenny’s estranged mother 
and step-father sought permanent, plenary guardianship over her, arguing that 
she had poor judgment about her own health, safety, and living arrangements.55  
The court adjudged Hatch incompetent and appointed a temporary, plenary 
organizational guardian.56  The organizational guardian placed Hatch in a group 
home, limited her social contacts, and had her work in a supervised workplace 
for adults with disabilities.57  Hatch challenged the necessity of having a legal 
guardian arguing that, although Olmstead addressed institutionalization, her loss 
of opportunity to live, work, and interact with others in the community should 
similarly be recognized as a violation of the ADA.58   
In its ruling, the Circuit Court of Newport News asserted that it had duties 
to provide Hatch with a “voice and choice,” to sufficiently explore alternatives 
to plenary guardianships, and to ensure that Hatch was considered an equal 
before the law.59  It denied Hatch’s mother and step-father’s petition for 
permanent, plenary guardianship, and instead named two of Hatch’s friends, Jim 
Talbert and Kelly Morris, temporary limited guardians for one year with the goal 
of transitioning to supported decision-making.60  This 2013 decision marks one 
of the first instances that a U.S. court formally ordered supported decision-
 
 51. Id. at 597. 
 52. See generally Robert D. Dinerstein, The Olmstead Imperative: The Right to Live in the 
Community and Beyond, 4 INCLUSION 16 (2016). 
 53. Self-Advocacy Materials, OLMSTEADRIGHTS, https://www.olmsteadrights.org/self-
helptools/advocacy-materials/folder.520254-Main_Menu (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
 54. Jenny Hatch, THE JENNY HATCH JUSTICE PROJECT, http://jennyhatchjusticeproject.org/jenny 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
 55. Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Restoring Voice to People with Cognitive Disabilities: Realizing the 
Right to Equal Recognition Before the Law, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 61, 71 (2019).   
 56. Sean Burke, Person-Centered Guardianship: How the Rise of Support Decision-Making and 
Person-Centered Services Can Help Olmstead’s Promise Get Here Faster, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. 
REV. 873, 875-876 (2016).   
 57. Margaret Jenny Hatch, Samantha Alexandra Crane, & Jonathan G. Martinis, Unjustified 
Isolation is Discrimination: The Olmstead Case Against Overbroad and Undue Organizational and 
Public Guardianship, 3 INCLUSION 65, 65 et seq (2015).   
 58. Id. 
 59. Ross v. Hatch, No. CWF120000426P-03, 2013 Va. Cir. LEXIS 413, at 4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 
2013). 
 60. Id. 
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making as an alternative to guardianship,61 and the decision acts as a template to 
advocate for subsequent cases.62   
In 2015, Texas became the first state to statutorily recognize supported 
decision-making agreements as an alternative to guardianship for persons who 
need assistance but are not entirely incapacitated.63 The law allows legal adults 
with cognitive or intellectual disabilities to enter into an agreement with a 
competent adult, according to which the individual with disabilities is enabled 
and supported to make decisions regarding living situations, medical care, and 
work.64  This written plan can then be shared with others, such as doctors, who 
“shall rely” on it and shall not be held liable for actions taken in good faith.65  In 
2017, Texas expanded the law, engaging safeguards against abuse by the 
supporter.66   
Texas’ supported decision-making law is generally intended to work in 
tandem with the state guardianship law to enhance opportunities for persons with 
disabilities and decrease the burden on the courts.67 Indeed, according to the 
Texas state court system, “[t]he exploration of alternatives to guardianship has 
reduced the number of guardianship applications filed in Texas, a trend that was 
not occurring prior to the reforms.”68   
While Texas was the vanguard, progress toward supported decision-making 
has been made across the United States.  In 2016, Delaware became the second 
state to statutorily recognize supported decision-making agreements,69 and 
several other states have followed suit or are currently considering similar 
legislation.70 The Uniform Law Commission’s 2017 Uniform Guardianship, 
Conservatorship, and Other Protective Arrangements Act (UGCOPAA) has also 
 
 61. Jasmine E. Harris, Processing Disability, 64 AM. L. REV. 457, 512 (2015). 
 62. See Order In re: Ryan Herbert King, No. INT 249 (D.C. Super. Ct. Prob. Div. 2016). 
 63. S.B. 1881, 84th Leg., Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. S.B. 39, 85th Leg., Sess. (Tex. 2017). 
 67. Texas Guardianship Reform: Protecting the Elderly and Incapacitated, THE ST. OF TEX. OFF. 
OF CT. ADMIN. 1, 3  (Jan. 2019), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1443314/texas-guardianship-
reform_jan-2019.pdf.   
 68. Id.   
 69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 9401-02. 
 70. H.B. 21, 149th Gen. Assem., 1st Year (Del. 2017); see also B. 20-0723, 20th Council Period, 
Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2015), B. 22-154, 22nd Council Period, Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2017) (Prior Bill: 2015 Bill 
Text D.C. B. 385), H.B. 2343, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2018), H.R. 91, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Me. 2017), S. 792, 435th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015), H.R. 4332, 189th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. 
(Mass. 2016),  S.B. 806, 99th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018), S.B. 264, 110th Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess, (Tenn. 2018), H.R.J. Res. 190, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014), Assem. B. 655, 103rd Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Wisc. 2017); see e.g., National Resource Center for Supported Decision Making, 
http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/States (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (providing a continuously updated 
archive of U.S. supported decision-making).  
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sought to advance supported decision-making.71  Notably, the UGCOPAA 
explicitly recognizes supported decision-making as a less restrictive alternative 
to surrogate decision-making regimes, such as guardianship.72 It argues that a 
guardian should not be appointed unless there is a finding by clear and 
convincing evidence, that an individual “is unable to receive or evaluate 
information or make or communicate decisions, even with appropriate 
supportive services, technological assistance, or supported decision making.”73  
At present, only Maine74 and Washington75 have adopted UGCOPAA,76 while 
New Mexico77 has adopted parts of it.78  In 2018, Alaska,79 the District of 
Columbia,80 and Wisconsin81 also formally recognized supported decision-
making regimes.  Indiana,82 North Dakota,83 Nevada,84 and Rhode Island85 
passed supported decision-making agreement laws in 2019.  These laws vary 
widely, including with respect to who may serve as a supporter (e.g., some states 
restrict who may serve as a supporter, while others do not) and the scope of 
decisions that may permissibly be enumerated in the agreement.86  Numerous 
other states have made relevant changes to their guardianship laws without 
addressing supported decision-making agreements.87  Collectively, these 
changes are viewed as “steps forward […] in safeguarding rights, addressing 
abuse, and promoting less restrictive options.”88   
 
 71. UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT 
(National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 2017).  
 72. Id. at § 102. 
 73. Id. at § 301. 
 74. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C, §§ 5-101–5-817. 
 75. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.72.005-.050; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.88.005-11.92.190.  
 76. Guardianship, Conservatorship, and Other Protected Arrangements Act, UNIFORM L. 
COMMISSION (2017), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?communitykey=2eba8654-8871-4905-ad38-aabbd573911c&tab=groupdetails.  
 77. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-301–45-5-315.  
 78. Commission on Law and Aging, State Adult Guardianship Legislation Summary: Directions of 
Reform, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1 (2018) [hereinafter ABA], 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2018-adult-guardianship-
legislative-summary.pdf. 
 79. H.R. 336, 30th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 2018) (amending AK R. EVID. 420, prohibiting the 
execution of a supported decision-making agreement from being used as evidence of a principal’s 
incapacity).   
 80. D.C. Sess. L. 22-0154, 22nd Council Sess. (D.C. 2018).  
 81. Wis. Legis. Assemb. 655. Reg. Sess. 2017-2018 (Wis.2017).  
 82. S IND. CODE §§29-3-14-1 – 29-3-14-13 (2019). 
 83. H.B. 1378, 66th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2019).  
 84. A.B. 480, 80th Legis. (Nev. 2019).  
 85. H.B. 5909, 2019 Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2019).  
 86. Zachary Allen and Dari Pogach, More States Pass Supported Decision-Making Agreement 
Laws, 41 J. OF THE AM. BAR ASSOC. COMM’N ON L. & AGING 1, 159-161 (2019). 
 87. ABA, supra note 78, at 1. 
 88. ABA, supra note 78, at 2. 
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Growing interest in and commitment to supported decision-making as an 
alternative to guardianship among U.S. courts, state legislatures, and legal 
practitioners suggests that “recent state laws are likely to serve as models for 
future legislation.”89  Therefore, “it is important to evaluate whether these laws 
are effective in promoting supported decision-making – and supporting 
individuals with disabilities to make their own choices.”90  We would suggest, 
however, that U.S. laws lag behind those of other countries, particularly in 
articulating the relationship between supported and surrogate decision-making 
regimes. We now turn to the international context to identify potential legal 
mechanisms that could rectify this gap. As we shall see, supported decision-
making laws of other countries also raise critical questions about how to 
transition between supported and surrogate decision-making for people with 
marginal capacity.91   
IV. SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT  
How should supported decision-making laws balance respect for autonomy 
and protection of the vulnerable?  How do we distinguish cases in which 
supported decision-making is preferable to surrogate decision-making and vice 
versa?  How can we transition between supported and surrogate decision-making 
regimes for people with dynamic impairments? And what circumstances might 
precipitate a switch from one decision-making model to the other? In what 
follows, we address these questions through legal frameworks of other countries 
and international policy. We argue that the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), as interpreted by the U.N. Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, provides little guidance in answering these 
questions. By contrast, supported decision-making laws of other countries—
Canada, Ireland, and Australia—provide preliminary answers, but there is no 
final resolution.92  
A. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
The CRPD has been central to the international movement toward 
supported decision-making and other forms of disability advocacy.93 The CRPD 
is designed “to promote, protect, and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to 
 
 89. Zachary Allen & Dari Pogach, More States Pass Supported Decision-Making Agreement Laws, 
41 J. OF THE AM. BAR ASSOC. COMM’N ON L. & AGING 1, 161 (2019). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See infra. Sections IV.B-IV.D. 
 92. Infra Sections IV.B-IV.D.  
 93. See generally United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS: DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, DISABILITY,  
https://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/COP/cosp9_infographic.pdf (Updated Oct. 10, 2016). 
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promote respect for their inherent dignity.”94  It is unique in that it systematically 
recognizes rights drawn from the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and establishes a conceptual link between the rights 
encapsulated by these foundational documents and their application in the 
context of disability.95  The CRPD emphasizes the “importance for persons with 
disabilities of their individual autonomy, including the freedom to make their 
own choices.”96  
Article 12 of the CRPD reaffirms the right of persons with disabilities to be 
recognized as equals before the law97 and is broadly regarded as a cornerstone 
for supported decision-making.98  Article 12(3), for example, specifically affirms 
that: “States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons 
with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal 
capacity.”99  Article 12(4) clarifies the kind of support that might be required, as 
capacity-related measures, which must “respect the rights, will, and preferences 
of the person” and be “proportional and tailored to the person.”100  This language 
implies that a range of support options will be required to accommodate diverse 
needs and preferences.101  The emphasis on support, evident throughout the 
CRPD, is consistent with the social model of disability.102   
The CRPD is regarded by some as an international mandate to adopt 
supported decision-making legislation for persons with cognitive or intellectual 
disabilities.103  However, following its adoption, there have been open questions 
about the nature and scope of Article 12. A first concern is that, given the 
description of support structures within the Article, there is a need to ensure that 
the provision of supported decision-making offers genuine support rather than 
being surrogate decision-making in disguise.104 Article 12(4) could plausibly 
justify the role that guardians, legal proxies, and surrogate decision-makers 
 
 94. Convention on the Rts. of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Res. U.N. Doc. A/61/106, art. 1, 
(Dec. 13, 2006). 
 95. Penny Weller, Supported Decision-Making and the Achievement of Non-Discrimination: The 
Promise and Paradox of the Disabilities Convention, 26 L. CONTEXT J. 85, 89 (2008).  
 96. Convention on the Rts. of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 94, at pmbl. 
 97. Convention on the Rts. of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 94, at art. 12.  
 98. Kohn et al., supra note 4, at 1113. 
 99. Convention on the Rts. of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 94, at art. 12. 
 100. Convention on the Rts. of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 94, at art. 12. 
 101. Fiona Morrissey, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A 
New Approach to Decision-Making in Mental Health Law, 19 EUR. J. OF HEALTH L. 423, 432 (2012).  
 102. Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from Guardianship to Supported Decision-
Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 9 (2012). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Anna Arstein-Kerslake et. al, Future Directions in Supported Decision-Making, 37 
DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2017). 
06 LARGENT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2021  12:12 PM 
284 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [23:2 
already play. But this may be antithetical to the original intent of the Article, 
namely, to enhance and guarantee the right of self-determination for persons with 
disabilities.105 
A second, related concern is whether Article 12 instead prohibits these 
surrogate decision-making regimes. A conservative reading of Article 12 
suggests that it does not, and some have argued that the Article even includes 
language that could plausibly justify surrogate decision-making under certain 
conditions.106  However, in 2014, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities published its first General Comment on Article 12, which takes 
a much more radical view.107  According to the General Comment, “persons with 
disabilities have been denied their right to legal capacity in many areas in a 
discriminatory manner under substitute decision making regimes such as 
guardianship [and] conservatorship,” and “these practices must be abolished in 
order to ensure that full legal capacity is restored to persons with disabilities on 
an equal basis with others.”108  The Comment goes on to state that States Parties 
have an obligation to abolish surrogate decision-making regimes and provide 
supported decision-making alternatives.109  Maintaining both surrogate and 
supported decision-making regimes, the Comment states, “is not sufficient” to 
comply with Article 12.110  We disagree with this radical reading of Article 12. 
Significantly, the General Comment on Article 12 does not have binding 
force on nations that have adopted the CRPD.111  There are several reasons why 
the General Comment should not guide supported decision-making legislation in 
the United States or abroad. First, the proposal to abolish surrogate decision-
making regimes is infeasible. As we have argued above, even if supported 
decision-making is feasible and desirable in the majority of cases, not all persons 
with disabilities will be able to exercise their autonomy even with fulsome 
support.112 The extent and nature of a person’s impairments, and the demands of 
some decision-making circumstances, will simply be too great for some 
individuals. Surrogate decision-making will be necessary in these cases.  
 
 105. See Lucy Series & Anna Nilsson, Article 12 CRPD: Equal Recognition Before the Law, in THE 
UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: A COMMENTARY (I. Bantekas, M. 
Stein, & D. Anastasiou eds., 2018). 
 106. Amita Dhanda, Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or 
Lodestar for the Future, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 429, 460-61 (2007).  
 107. See Committee on the Rts. of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment on Article 12: Equal 
Recognition Before the Law, U.N. Doc. GE. 13-49143/11 (2014).  
 108. Id. at 3.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 6. 
 111. Stig Langvad et al., The Purpose and Use of UN Treaty Body General Comments, THE 
EUROPEAN NETWORK ON INDEP.LIVING (2018), https://enil.eu/news/the-purpose-and-use-of-un-treaty-
body-general-comments/. 
 112. Joseph Dute, Should Substituted Decision-Making be Abolished?, 22 EUR. J. OF HEALTH L. 315, 
318 (2015).  
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Second, abolition of surrogate decision-making fails to strike any justifiable 
balance between the competing ethical duties of respect for autonomy and 
protection of the vulnerable.113  Nations surely should endeavor to enhance the 
autonomy of persons with disabilities, but enhancing their autonomy should not 
come at the expense of safeguarding welfare.  Enhancing autonomy at all costs 
could result in policies and practices that permit persons with diminished 
capacity to make decisions that could reasonably be expected to result in harm 
to them or others.114 This is unacceptable.  
Critical analysis of the scope and mandate of the CRPD points to, but does 
not resolve, the key tension at the heart of supported-decision making laws—
how to balance respect for autonomy and protection of vulnerable individuals.  
Therefore, we must look elsewhere for guidance.   
B. Canada: The British Columbia Representation Agreement Act  
In the 1990s, Canadian disability advocacy groups conceived of supported 
decision-making as a means to facilitate the self-determination of people with 
intellectual disabilities in the receipt of provincial benefits and financial 
planning.115  In 1992, the first framework for supported decision-making was 
outlined in the Canadian Association for Community Living Task Force report, 
Alternatives to Guardianship.116 Among its enumerated principles, the report 
claimed that: 
[A]ll adults have the right to self-determination with the support, 
affection, and assistance of family and friends of their choosing…; 
that the cornerstone of supported decision making is a trusting 
relationship between a person giving support and a person receiving 
support; and that the law must not discriminate on the basis of … a 
person’s capacity or competence.117 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. See generally Alec Buchanan, Mental Capacity, Legal Competence, and Consent to Treatment, 
97 J. ROYAL SOC’Y. OF MED. 415, 416-17 (2004).  
 115. See Michelle Browning, Christine Bigby, & Jacinta Douglas, Supported Decision Making: 
Understanding How its Conceptual Link to Legal Capacity is Influencing the Development of Practice, 
1 RES. & PRAC. INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES, 34, 35-36 (2014) (discussing the focus of Canadian 
reform efforts on eradicating barriers to self-determination and individualized funding); see also Robert 
M. Gordon, The Emergence of Assisted (Supported) Decision-Making in the Canadian Law of Adult 
Guardianship and Substitute Decision-Making, 23 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY, 61, 61-62 (2000) 
(discussing Canadian reforms in areas of adult guardianship and substitute decision-making).  
 116. Michelle Browning, Christine Bigby, & Jacinta Douglas, Supported Decision Making: 
Understanding How its Conceptual Link to Legal Capacity is Influencing the Development of Practice, 
1 RES. & PRAC. INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES, 34, 35 (2014). 
 117. Id. 
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These principles were subsequently adopted into Canadian provincial law 
in Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Yukon, and Alberta.118 
British Columbia is recognized by the United Nations as “one of the leading 
jurisdictions in incorporating supported decision-making into law, policy and 
practice.”119  The Representation Agreement Act of 1996 provides one model for 
balancing the competing goals of respect for autonomy and protection of the 
vulnerable.120  It authorizes a person or persons to assist an adult (19 years of age 
or older) with decision-making or to act on the adult’s behalf.121  A representation 
agreement is intended to serve as a legal alternative to guardianship but may also 
be an adjunct to it.122  Here is an example from Nidus, a community-based 
resource center with expertise on representation agreements: 
Cherry is a woman whose speech and memory has been affected by a 
brain injury.  The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) is managing her 
financial and legal affairs . . . but nothing is in place for health and 
personal care.  Cherry makes a [representation agreement] for health 
and personal care . . . and names her sister as her representative . . . to 
help her with her health and personal care decisions, such as decisions 
about rehabilitation and occupational therapy. Her representative will 
talk with the PGT for Cherry’s money to pay for treatments and 
equipment needed to improve quality of life.123 
The Representation Agreement Act is also intended to accommodate 
conditions characterized by dynamic impairments, as illustrated by the case of 
Joyce, a woman diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease:  
[A]s Joyce’s dementia has progressed, she now needs help with her 
health and personal care decisions.  It is more difficult for her to 
remember important details.  Naming [her friend] Barb as her 
representative for health care and personal care matters . . . gave Joyce 
peace of mind.  Barb can be present during medical appointments to 
help Joyce speak up for her wishes.  Barb can help by picking up 
medications and the pharmacy and accessing information and 
communicating with health care providers on Joyce’s behalf.124   
 
 118. The Vulnerable Persons Living with a Mental Disability Act, S.M. 1993, c.V90 (Can.); 
Representation Agreement Act, S.B.C. 1996 (Can.); Adult Guardianship and Co-Decision Making Act, 
R.S.S. 2000(Can.); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, S. A. 2008 (Can.).  
 119. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS & OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR HUM. RIGHTS & 
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION., HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITY: FROM EXCLUSION TO EQUALITY REALIZING THE RIGHT OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, at ch.6  U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/07/6, (2007). 
 120. See Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C.1996 (Can.).  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Representation Agreement: Section 7 Standard Powers, NIDUS PERS. RESOURCE CTR. AND 
REGISTRY 1, 2 (2011) [hereinafter Representation Agreement], 
http://www.nidus.ca/PDFs/Nidus_FactSheet_RA_Section7.pdf.   
 124. Id. 
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Thus, the Representation Agreement Act offers a useful way of thinking about 
the core issues under consideration in this article.   
The beneficiary can give his representative(s)—comparable to 
supporters—authority to handle personal and health care matters, as well as legal 
and routine financial affairs.125  The duties of the representative include 
“consult[ing], to the extent reasonable, with the adult to determine his or her 
current wishes and comply[ing] with those wishes when it is reasonable to do 
so.”126 The depth and scope of the representative’s consultation with the 
beneficiary is not, however, well-defined.127 This raises a potential concern that 
consultation may be only cursory, falling short of the meaningful exchange that 
is desired.128  The Act qualifies the representative’s duties, stating that, if “the 
[vulnerable] adult’s current wishes cannot be determined or it is not reasonable 
to comply with them, the representative must comply with any instructions or 
wishes the adult expressed while capable.”129 In these cases, the representative 
must apply a substituted-judgment or a best-interests standard, consistent with 
what is known about the beneficiary’s values.130  Thus, the representation 
agreement anticipates and accommodates the need for transitioning between 
supported and surrogate decision-making regimes within a single document.   
The key mechanism for transitioning between supported and surrogate 
decision-making is twofold.131  First, the beneficiary’s wishes must themselves 
be reasonable.132  Second, compliance with the beneficiary’s wishes must also 
be reasonable.133 This distinction is important, as it suggests scenarios in which 
a beneficiary’s wishes are reasonable, but complying with those wishes is not.134 
A beneficiary might reasonably desire a certain living arrangement, yet 
 
 125. See generally Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 405 (Can.) (recognizing two 
types of agreements, one more expansive than the other); see RA Overview Fact Sheet, NIDUS PERS. 
RESOURCE CTR. & REGISTRY 2, https://www.nidus.ca/representation-agreement/overview-fact-sheet/ 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (describing a “Section 7 Agreement” which covers routine daily living 
requirements); see Representation Agreement, supra note 106 (describing a “Section 9 Agreement” 
which covers a broader swath of decisions); Representation Agreement: Section 7 Standard Powers 
(RA7), NIDUS PERS. RESOURCE CTR. & REGISTRY , https://www.nidus.ca/representation-agreement/ra-9-
fact-sheet/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (explaining the level of capacity required to make a Section 9 
Agreement is higher than that required to make a Section 7 Agreement).  
 126. Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 405, pt. 3, § 16.2(a)-(b) (Can.). 
 127. Sarah Burningham, Developments in Canadian Adult Guardianship and Co-Decision-Making 
Law, 18 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 125 (2009). 
 128. Id.   
 129. Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, pt 3, c 405, § 16 (3) (Can.). 
 130. Id. at § 16(4)(a)-(b). 
 131. See Shih-Ning Then, The Evolution and Innovation in Guardianships Laws: Assisted Decision-
Making, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 133, 155-57 (2013) (discussing similar conceptual issues). 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
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compliance with this request might be infeasible, for example, due to cost.135 A 
supporter would likely not be required to comply with this request.136 The 
request’s infeasibility makes compliance unreasonable, even though the request 
itself may be reasonable.137   
Although this aspect of B.C. law provides helpful guidance for determining 
when, and under what circumstances, the transition between supported and 
surrogate decision-making is warranted, this approach may raise more questions 
than it resolves.138 In particular, the meaning of ‘reasonable’ with respect to a 
beneficiary’s request and the supporter’s compliance with that request leaves 
considerable room for interpretation.139 Although ‘reasonability’ is a familiar 
concept in the law, referring to what would be appropriate in the circumstances, 
this definition may be open to debate in practice.140  For example, a request (e.g., 
to live alone or to obtain a driver’s license) could be regarded as reasonable when 
made by one beneficiary, but deemed unreasonable if made by another 
beneficiary, or if made by the same beneficiary at a different time.141 It is also 
unclear who should determine whether ‘reasonableness’ applies.142  In practice, 
a supporter will often need to make these judgments in real time.143 This could 
place supporters in a conflicted situation; they must commit to supporting the 
beneficiary while also faithfully determining whether it would be better to take 
on a surrogate decision-making role.144  This raises the danger of slipping into 
de facto surrogate decision-making.145 
C. Ireland: The Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act (2015)  
Ireland’s Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act of 2015 offers another 
model for balancing respect for autonomy and protection of the vulnerable.146 
The Act, signed by Ireland’s President in 2015, replaces the Ward of Courts 
system of the Lunacy Regulation Act of 1871.147 Previous decision-making laws 
 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. See id. at 164 (discussing the difficulty of determining helping a person who is capable of 
making decisions or assisting a person with a disability to make and communicate their decisions 
without influencing the final decision and becoming a de facto decisions maker). 
 146. See generally Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (Act No. 64/2015) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/64/enacted/en/html. 
 147. Brendan Desmond Kelly, The Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015: What It Is and 
Why It Matters, IRISH J. OF MED. SCI. 351, 351 (2017).  
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in Ireland inadequately addressed the nuances of decision-making for people 
with marginal capacity.148 Wardship courts were authorized to make all personal 
and financial decisions for incapacitated persons, and they lacked sufficient 
mechanisms to respond to changes in a person’s capacity over time.149 The 
Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act was designed to address these and 
other issues and is broadly regarded as “the most significant development in Irish 
capacity legislation in over a century.”150 
The Act builds upon complimentary policy regarding informal decision-
making in clinical settings. Ireland’s Health Service Executive National Consent 
Policy advises clinicians to support and encourage incapacitated patients to be 
involved in decisions, to identify incapacitated patient’s previously expressed 
wishes, and to involve patient advocates in decision-making.151 However, some 
legal scholars have noted that, in practice, these recommendations are not often 
adhered to and clinicians will usually seek consent from patients’ next-of-kin.152  
The Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act thus fills a critical gap in Irish 
decision-making legislation for incapacitated persons. 
The Act specifies two decision-making roles that might be relevant to U.S. 
supported decision-making legislation.153 The first role is a “decision-making 
assistant” who is appointed by a beneficiary to assist in making decisions 
regarding welfare and property, as specified in a decision-making assistance 
agreement.154 The assistant supports a beneficiary by obtaining and explaining 
information, determining the beneficiary’s preferences, and assisting the 
beneficiary in expressing them.155 The role of a decision-making assistant is thus 
consistent with that of a supporter in U.S. law.156  A second role specified by the 
Act is a “co-decision maker.”157 Unlike a decision-making assistant, a co-
decision maker is authorized to jointly make decisions with the beneficiary 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See generally National Consent Policy – Quality Improvement Programmes, NAT’L QUALITY 
IMPROVEMENT TEAM, https://www.hse.ie/eng/about/who/qid/other-quality-improvement-
programmes/consent/national-consent-policy.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2020). 
 152. See Mary Donnelly, Deciding in Dementia: The Possibilities and Limits of Supported Decision-
Making, 66 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 6 (2019) (explaining that CDM Agreements will be overlooked 
in favor of the more commonly known instrument, Power of Attorney, due the complexity and novelty 
of co-decision-making).  
 153. See generally Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (Act No. 64/2015) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/64/enacted/en/html; see also supra Section III.  
 154. Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (Act No. 64/2015) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/64/enacted/en/html (defining decision-making assistant in pt. 
3 § 9). 
 155. Donnelly, supra note 152. 
 156. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 157. Donnelly, supra note 152. 
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regarding welfare and property, as specified in a co-decision-making 
agreement.158 This role provides the supporter greater authority in the decision-
making process. The general purpose of the co-decision-making role is to aid the 
beneficiary in relevant decisions, but a co-decision maker may also block the 
beneficiary from making decisions in particular circumstances.159 
The Act states that, “a co-decision-maker shall acquiesce with the wishes 
of the appointer in respect of the relevant decision, unless it is reasonably 
foreseeable that such acquiescence […] will result in serious harm to the 
appointer or to another person.”160 This co-decision-making mechanism is 
interesting for two reasons. First, it defaults to supported decision-making by 
requiring that the co-decision-maker “acquiesce” with the wishes of the 
beneficiary.161 This is similar to the role of a decision-making assistant, who is 
required to support a beneficiary’s legal capacity and not make decisions for 
her.162 Yet, a co-decision-maker is also provided limited ‘veto power’ over the 
beneficiary’s decisions.163 This oversight mechanism prevents the co-decision-
maker from actively making decisions for the beneficiary, yet allows her to 
temper decisions that are not agreeable.  This suggests a surrogate decision-
maker may still be needed. 
This decision-making mechanism is also interesting because it specifies the 
conditions under which a ‘veto’ is authorized.164 The co-decision-maker is only 
permitted to block a beneficiary’s decision if that decision will likely result in 
serious harm.165 This feature of Irish law might provide greater specificity for the 
conditions sufficient to refuse a beneficiary’s wishes, as compared to the B.C. 
Representation Agreement Act.166 As described above, B.C. law hinges on a 
legal standard of reasonableness for compliance with a beneficiary’s wishes, but 
Irish law defers to probability of serious harm to the beneficiary or others.167 If a 
dispute arises between a supporter and beneficiary, the probability of serious 
 
 158. Id.; see also Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (Act No. 64/2015) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/64/enacted/en/html (referring to pt. 4, § 19). 
 159. Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (Act No. 64/2015) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/64/enacted/en/html (referring to pt. 4, § 19). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Donnelly, supra note 152. 
 163. See Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (Act No. 64/2015) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/64/enacted/en/html (referring to pt 4, § 19(5)(a)-(b) which 
allows co-decision makers to refuse to sign a document if he or she finds that signing the documents 
would result in serious harm to the appointer or to another person).  
 164. Id.   
 165. Id. 
 166. See supra Section IV.B. 
 167. Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 405, § 16 (Can.); Assisted Decision-Making 
(Capacity) Act 2015 (Act No. 64/2015) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/64/enacted/en/html (referring to pt 4, § 19 of the Act). 
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harm standard may be easier to apply in practice than the reasonableness 
standard.  We hypothesize that it might also allow the beneficiary greater latitude 
to exercise her autonomy, as it will often be a higher bar to surmount. All 
decisions that result in serious harm will likely be unreasonable, but not all 
unreasonable decisions will result in serious harm.   
Although the Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act constitutes a 
considerable advancement in Irish decision-making law, and may provide 
guidance for U.S. legislation, several critical questions have been raised about 
its features. Some theorists have questioned the distinction between a decision-
making assistant and a co-decision maker.168 The Assisted Decision Making 
(Capacity) Act implies that co-decision-makers are more involved in the 
decision-making process than decision-making assistants, yet, according to 
critics, this is not clearly stated in the legislation.169   
One way to respond to this concern, as we have highlighted above, is to 
note a co-decision-maker’s ‘veto power’ over a beneficiary’s decision, which is 
not held by decision-making assistants.170 This ‘veto power’ is perhaps akin to 
the decision-making relationship between a parent and a teenager, in which the 
parent supports the teenager’s nascent autonomy. A teenager is not yet of legal 
majority, and thus is not authorized to provide consent; however, a caring parent 
can support the teenager in decision-making by acquiescing to her requests 
unless a veto is warranted. In our reading of the legislation, a decision-making 
assistant would not play this decision-making role, but a co-decision maker 
would. 
A second question concerns the Act’s relation to Article 12 of the CRPD.171 
The Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act is broadly regarded as Ireland’s 
commitment to the CRPD.172 However, contrary to the above-outlined General 
Comment on Article 12, the legislation does not eliminate surrogate decision-
making regimes.173 Rather, Ireland’s Department of Justice and Equality has 
indicated that, “on ratification, Ireland will issue a declaration, along similar lines 
to the declarations issued by Australia, Canada and Norway that it is the State’s 
understanding that the CRPD allows for substitute decision-making where such 
arrangements are necessary as a last resort and subject to safeguards.”174 We 
 
 168. Kelly, supra note 147, at 355. 
 169. Donnelly, supra note 152, at 6.  
 170. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.  
 171. Donnelly, supra note 152, at 5. 
 172. Donnelly, supra note 152, at 5. 
 173. Compare supra Section IV.A., with Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (Act No. 
64/2015) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/64/enacted/en/html. 
 174. See Roadmap to Ratification of the Untied National Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (UN CRPD), DEP’T OF JUST. & EQUALITY 4-5, 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Roadmap%20to%20Ratification%20of%20CRPD.pdf/Files/Roadmap%2
0to%20Ratification%20of%20CRPD.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2020) (indicating that the enactment of 
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agree with this approach, as it is consistent with our view that supported and 
surrogate decision-making regimes are complementary.  Yet, in a notable 
oversight, the Act does not provide for the transition between supported and 
surrogate decision-making.  
D. Australia: The Victoria Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Act 
2016 
Australia has also taken steps to integrate supported decision-making into 
state law. In 2014, the Australian Law Reform Commission released a report, 
Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws.175  The report echoed 
much of the language of Article 12 in the CRPD.176  Yet, despite advocating for 
a supported decision-making regime, the report noted that “some system of 
appointment of others is a necessary human rights backstop.”177  The report 
observed that the Offices of the Public Advocate (South Australia and Victoria) 
“identified the danger that an ‘overemphasis’ on a person’s autonomy may be ‘to 
the detriment of protection for people who need guardianship as a rights 
enhancing mechanism.’”178  The report identified many of the challenges that 
animate our work here, namely, when is it appropriate to appoint someone to act 
on behalf of another, and what test should be used to determine when this should 
happen?179 
Presently, Victoria is among the Australian states boasting the most well-
developed legislation, with four laws that include provisions for supported 
decision-making: National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013; Powers of 
Attorney Act 2014; Mental Health Act 2014; and Medical Treatment Planning 
and Decisions Act 2016.180  Each law recognizes a distinct legal role for 
supporters.181  For example, the Powers of Attorney Act recognizes a ‘supportive 
attorney’ who has power to access or provide information about the beneficiary 
to organizations (e.g., banks or hospitals); to communicate with organizations; 
to communicate their decisions; and to give effect to their decisions.182  By 
 
the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 was an effort to comply with certain provisions of 
Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities).  
 175. See generally AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, EQUALITY, CAPACITY AND DISABILITY IN 
COMMONWEALTH LAWS (Aug. 29, 2014). 
 176. See 2515 U.N.T.S. 44910. 
 177. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, EQUALITY, CAPACITY AND DISABILITY IN 
COMMONWEALTH LAWS 1, 60 (Aug. 29, 2014). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 61. 
 180. OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING IN VICTORIA: A GUIDE FOR 
FAMILIES AND CARERS  6-7 (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/resources/booklets/advance-planning-booklets/447-guide-to-
supported-decision-making/file. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 7. 
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contrast, the Mental Health Act recognizes a ‘nominated person’ who represents 
a mental health consumer’s interests and serves as a support in the event they 
become a patient under the Mental Health Act.183  A practical challenge for 
supporters, beneficiaries, and those who work with them is to understand and 
determine how best to navigate this multiplicity of laws.   
Here, we will focus on one of these laws, the Medical Treatment Planning 
and Decisions Act 2016.184  Given that existing laws were fragmented and 
leading to confusion in practice, the Act created clear obligations for clinicians 
caring for people who lack decision-making capacity.185  Under the Act, 
Victorians are able to appoint a “medical treatment decisionmaker.”186  A 
medical treatment decision-maker is responsible for making medical decisions 
for an incapacitated individual. The Act also introduced the process for formally 
appointing a “support person.”187 A support person is responsible for 
representing the interests of the beneficiary in making, communicating, and 
effectuating treatment decisions.188  Once appointed, a support person has 
automatic access to medical information, allowing her to compile or to help 
interpret information.189 A support person’s potential role does not necessarily 
end when the beneficiary is determined to lack decision-making capacity, 
however. The support person may, for instance, explain previous treatment 
preferences to the medical staff.190  The distinction between medical treatment 
decision-makers and support persons is similar to the difference in roles we have 
identified between surrogate decision-makers and supporters.191  Whereas 
surrogates make decisions for the beneficiary, supporters assist beneficiaries in 
making their own decisions.192  
The Act specifies that “being a support person does not preclude a person 
from also being a medical treatment decision maker.”193  Both roles are governed 
by distinct agreements, which must be authorized by the beneficiary, provided 
that she has the capacity to do so.194  When the same person occupies both roles, 
this may facilitate the transition between supported and surrogate decision-
making.  Here is an illustrative vignette from the Office of the Public Advocate:  
 
 183. Id. 
 184. See generally Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Act 2016 (Austl.). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at pt 1 s 1.  
 187. Id. at pt 3 div 3 s 31. 
 188. Id. at pt 3 div 3 s 32. 
 189. Id. at pt 7 s 94.  
 190. OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, supra note 180, at 7. 
 191. See supra Section II. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Act 2016 pt 3 div 3 s 32 (Austl.). 
 194. Id. at pt 3 div 2 s.  
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Elizabeth, 79, is a widow with dementia.  She has a fall at home . . . 
and is taken to hospital with a broken hip.  Elizabeth[‘s daughter], 
Catherine . . . receives a call from the hospital telling her Elizabeth 
needs surgery.  The doctor seeks consent from Catherine to operate 
because Elizabeth cannot provide it herself.  Catherine tells the doctor 
Elizabeth has appointed her as Medical Treatment Decision Maker 
and Support Person.  Catherine provides verbal consent for the surgery 
. . . and catches the first available flight to be with Elizabeth.195 _ 
The vignette goes on to describe how, after surgery, Catherine transitions 
back to the role of support person, and assists Elizabeth in deciding to go to 
rehabilitation by taking notes, asking questions, and drawing on her knowledge 
of her mother’s priorities.196 
Supported and surrogate decision-making regimes are thus recognized as 
complementary in Australian law, but a beneficiary’s autonomy is best respected 
by creating a bulwark against allowing supported decision-making to slide into 
surrogate decision-making.  Unlike Canadian and Irish law, Victoria’s Medical 
Treatment Planning and Decisions Act does not provide clear guidance in cases 
of conflict between the support person and the beneficiary, nor does it clearly 
specify when a support person is authorized to transition into a treatment decision 
maker role, other than specifying that the beneficiary lacks decision-making 
capacity. A document for clinicians published by the Victoria State Government 
states that “[a] support person may help to ensure that the person is able to make 
their own decisions for longer,”197 but it is unclear about how the line between 
capacity with support and lack of capacity with support is to be assessed in 
practice. This places Australian law in a similar predicament as U.S. legislation: 
the roles of guardians and supporters are clear when a beneficiary’s cognitive 
and functional impairments are relatively stable, but they are unclear when the 
beneficiary’s impairments change dynamically.   
V. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES  
Supported decision-making continues to be a work in progress—at home 
and abroad.  An examination of legislation in other countries highlights potential 
strategies for furthering the project of supported decision-making in the United 
States.  Here, we draw several lessons.  
As a first step, consistent with the laws of some other countries, supported 
decision-making agreements should be formally recognized across the United 
States because they are less restrictive alternatives to guardianship and promote 
 
 195. OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, supra note 180, at 10. 
 196. OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, supra note 180, at 10-11. 
 197. VICTORIA STATE GOV’T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., A GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL TREATMENT 
PLANNING AND DECISIONS ACT 2016: FOR HEALTH PRACTITIONERS 11 (Victorian Government, 2d ed. 
2017).  
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the rights of persons with disabilities.  While there has been significant progress 
in this direction, more work is needed to ensure that supported decision-making 
is available to all Americans who might benefit from it.   
Second, it is important to recognize that a beneficiary may desire support 
across many decision-making domains, such as medical, legal, financial, or 
others.  It is desirable to limit the work that beneficiaries must do to formally 
access support for the breadth of their decision-making needs.  In this respect, 
the B.C. Representation Agreement Act, which allows for one agreement to 
govern a range of decisions, is clearly preferable to the legal framework in 
Victoria, where different kinds of decisions are governed by distinct 
agreements.198 
Third, as the vignettes throughout this article illustrate, individuals with 
dynamic impairments may need to transition between supported and surrogate 
decision-making.199  Because capacity is decision- and context-specific, the two 
modes of decision-making need to be available simultaneously.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider how supported and surrogate decision-making regimes can 
complement each other in practice.  In this respect, B.C. has again struck an 
appealing compromise by permitting one agreement to anticipate both kinds of 
decision-making.200   
Fourth, U.S. lawmakers will need to provide greater specificity regarding 
the conditions under which respect for autonomy is outweighed by a duty to 
protect the vulnerable, thereby triggering a switch from supported to surrogate 
decision-making.  As we observed, B.C. law invokes a reasonableness standard 
for compliance with a beneficiary’s wishes, while Irish law permits a supporter 
to refuse to comply if the beneficiary’s wishes will likely result in harm.201 These 
are helpful starting points for optimizing U.S. supported decision-making laws.  
We’ve suggested that the reasonableness standard may be more difficult to apply 
in practice and may permit greater restrictions on a beneficiary’s decision-
making.  Similar mechanisms will also be needed to specify when surrogate 
decision-making can transition to supported decision-making, for instance, 
during recovery from neurological insult. 
Existing laws leave room for interpretation and refinement. We expect that 
this will be an important area of future research for disability law scholars and 
bioethicists as supported decision-making continues to spread across the United 
States.   
 
 198. Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 405, pt 2, § 7 (Can.); OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
ADVOCATE, supra note 180 and accompanying text.  
 199. Supra Section II. 
 200. Supra Section IV.B. 
 201. Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 405, pt 3, § 16.2(a)-(b) (Can.); Assisted 
Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (Act No. 64/2015) (Ir.), pt 4, § 19, 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/64/enacted/en/html; supra Section II. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
We have argued here that supported and surrogate decision-making regimes 
are both complementary and necessary for people at the margins of autonomy, 
and particularly for those individuals with dynamic impairments. Our view sits 
in contrast to a radical reading of the CRPD, which suggests that surrogate 
decision-making regimes should be abolished.202 We further argued that 
recognition of both supported and surrogate decision-making regimes requires 
legal mechanisms to transition between them, either in cases in which a person 
needs greater protections as cognitive and functional impairments worsen, or in 
which a person should be given greater autonomy as they recover from 
neurological injury. We briefly reviewed aspects of three international supported 
decision-making laws to determine how other countries have addressed this 
issue.  Further analysis of the laws of other countries will prove fruitful as 
supported decision-making gains momentum in the United States.  
The formal project of supported decision-making is still relatively new in 
the United States, though supported decision-making as a general practice is not.  
Supportive relationships for people with cognitive impairments have long 
emerged organically from family ties and friendships.  The formal project of 
supported decision-making merely seeks to build upon these tried-and-tested 
methods.  The task at hand for legal scholars and lawmakers is to systematize 
these relationships so they can be incorporated in U.S. law and utilized by a broad 
population of stakeholders.   
 
 
 202. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text. 
